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Kennedy and the Tail of Minos
J Richard Broughton*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Dante's Inferno, Minos sat as the ultimate judge of human
sin.' Dante explains in Canto V that when the damned appeared in
Hell, they would confess their sins to Minos, who would then wrap
his tail around his body.2 The circle to which the soul was assigned
was determined by the number of times that Minos wrapped his
tail.3 Dante's recognition of Minos in this role was no accident:
Minos, son of Zeus and Europa and king of Crete, was known as a
wise and just ruler and lawgiver,4 and his role as a leading judge in
the Underworld is described by Virgil 5 (who guides Dante's main
character through Hell in the Inferno).
Dante's description of the punishment in Hell and the
procedure for receiving it provides important lessons for us with
respect to the definition and administration of the criminal law. Of
course, it reminds us that punishment matters, that who and to
what extent we punish tells us about our morality, humanity, and
our commitment to safeguarding the political community. It
reminds us, too, that punishment matters to our politics because
political institutions must be capable of controlling the people;
6
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1. DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO 41 (Allen Mandelbaum trans., 1980) (1308).
2. Id. ("There dreadful Minos stands, gnashing his teeth:/examining the
sins of those who enter,/he judges and assigns as his tail twines./I mean that
when the spirit born to evil/appears before him it confesses all;/and he, the
connoisseur of sin, can tell/the depth in Hell appropriate to it").
3. Id. ("[A]s many times as Minos wraps his tail/around himself, that
marks the sinner's level.").
4. See PIERRE GRIMAL, THE DICTIONARY OF CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY 275-
76 (Stephen Kershaw ed., 1991) (1951). It is interesting that Minos is introduced
in Canto V at the entrance to the Circle that contains the lustful. Minos, in
addition to his reputation as a lawgiver, was also known to have numerous
mistresses which led Pasiphae, his wife, to curse him (the curse was then lifted
by Procris, whom he tried to seduce). Id.
5. See VIRGIL, THE AENEID 139 (Harlan Hoge Ballard trans., 1930).
6. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961). See also J. Richard Broughton, The Second Death of Capital
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criminal and penal legislation are manifestations of that effort.
Depriving human beings of their freedom and sometimes their
lives is a tragic but necessary responsibility of the state. In this
sense, Dante reminds us that it matters who determines criminal
punishment and how it is determined. That question has special
significance for American government and politics because its
resolution sits squarely at the intersection of constitutionalism and
criminal justice: in the effort to control both the governed and
those who govern (as our system contemplates), to what extent
should the punishment decisions of judicial actors and institutions
take priority over the punishment decisions of political actors and
institutions?
These concerns about whom, why, and how we punish and
about the political considerations that attend the challenge of
violent crime in America have particular force in the debate about
both the death penalty and particular applications of it as well as
the Supreme Court's role in regulating it. The Supreme Court's
recent decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana7 concerning the
constitutionality of Louisiana's capital child rape statute
demonstrates the force of these concerns about what punishment is
appropriate and who should make the determination about its
propriety. In light of the Court's aggressive posture in favoring
claims of categorical exemption from capital punishment, it is still
useful to ask: has our Constitution entrusted the Court to act as a
kind of contemporary Minos? Kennedy (the opinion authored for
the Court by-to make the matter somewhat more confusing to
discuss-Justice Kennedy) struck down the statute, which had
been consistently upheld by the Louisiana Supreme Court8 as
violating the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishments. The statute provided the death penalty for aggravated
rape of a child under the age of thirteen.9 The United States
Punishment, 58 FLA. L. REV. 639, 662 (2006) (discussing Madison's observation
that government must first control the governed, then control itself).
7. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
8. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 957 So. 2d 757 (La. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct.
2641 (2008). See also State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996), cert. denied
Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997) (upholding constitutionality of
capital child rape statute).
9. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (2007). A substantial body of scholarship
exists concerning the Louisiana capital child rape statute and on the subject
more broadly. See, e.g., J. Richard Broughton, "On Horror's Head Horrors
Accumulate": A Reflective Comment on Capital Child Rape Legislation, 39
DUQ. L. REV. 1 (2000); Annaliese Flynn Fleming, Louisiana's Newest Capital
Crime: The Death Penalty for Child Rape, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717
(1999); James H.S. Levine, Creole and Unusual Punishment-A Tenth
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military, Georgia, Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas
all have similar statutes.'
0
In the Louisiana case, Patrick Kennedy was convicted under
this statute in 2003 for brutally raping his eight-year-old
stepdaughter.'" Kennedy challenged the law under the Court's
Anniversary Examination of Louisiana's Capital Rape Statute, 51 VILE. L. REV.
417 (2006); Melissa Meister, Murdering Innocence: The Constitutionality of
Capital Child Rape Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 197 (2003); Emily Marie Moeller,
Devolving Standards of Decency: Using the Death Penalty to Punish Child
Rapists, 102 DICK. L. REV. 621 (1998); Corey Rayburn, Better Dead Than
R(ap)ed?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital Child Rape Statutes, 78 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 1119 (2004); Joanna H. D'Avella, Note, Death Row for Child
Rape? Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the Roper-Atkins "Evolving
Standards of Decency" Framework, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (2006).
10. See National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2006, Pub.
L.No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3136, 3263 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a)(1)-(2)
(2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-303 (2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
7115(E) (West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(C)(I) (Supp. 2007); TEX.
PENAL CODE § 12.42(c)(3) (West Supp. 2008).
Some controversy in the Kennedy litigation concerned the omission-by the
Court and the parties-of the UCMJ provision, known as section 552(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, making child rape a capital
offense. The State filed a petition for rehearing, and the United States joined in
the request as amicus curiae. The omission resulted in requests from
commentators that the Court correct its error. See, e.g., Editorial, Supreme Slip-
Up, WASH. POST, July 5, 2008, at A14 (arguing that the Court grant rehearing);
Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court is Wrong on the Death Penalty, WALL
ST. J., July 31, 2008, at A13 (arguing that the Court wrongly decided the case).
On October 1, 2008, the Court modified the opinion, adding a footnote
concluding that the UCMJ provision did not alter the Court's original national
consensus analysis. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct 2641, 2653 n. (2008).
Justices Kennedy and Scalia issued separate statements regarding the Court's
holding.
11. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2646-48. According to the evidence presented at
trial, when police arrived at Kennedy's home, the stepdaughter, L.H., was found
wrapped in a bloody blanket and was bleeding profusely from her vagina. Her
cervix and vagina had been separated as a result of the rape, such that her rectum
protruded into her vagina; her injuries required emergency surgery. A pediatric
forensic expert testified that her injuries were "the most severe he had seen from
a sexual assault in his four years of practice." Id. at 2646. L.H. initially did not
implicate Kennedy in the crime, and Kennedy denied his own involvement.
After L.H. returned home to her mother on June 22, 1998, following a period of
removal from the mother's custody, L.H. told her mother that Kennedy had
raped her. Kennedy was arrested and charged under the capital rape statute after
L.H. gave a videotaped statement with the Child Advocacy Center. At trial L.H.
recounted the rape, and said she overheard Kennedy on the telephone saying she
had "become a 'young lady."' Id. at 2648. She admitted that she had initially
falsely accused two neighborhood boys of the crime. The evidence presented at
trial also showed that Kennedy sexually abused another eight-year-old girl, S.L.
(who is related to Kennedy's ex-wife), on three occasions.
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1977 decision in Coker v. Georgia,12 in which a plurality of the
Court held that the death penalty was grossly disproportionate for
the crime of raping an adult woman. Justice Powell's separate
opinion questioned whether the death penalty could ever be
proportionate for rape, including the rape of a child.' 3 Answering
that question, the Court in Kennedy held that the Louisiana statute
failed to satisfy the two-pronged analysis that the Court has
developed for Eighth Amendment cases in which the defendant
seeks a cate orical exemption from the imposition of capital
punishment.1 First, there is an existing national consensus against
the practice of employing the death penalty in civilian cases of
child rape. And second, in the Court's own independent
judgment, rape--even the rape of a child-does not compare with
murder in terms of the individual harm that it produces.
16
Therefore, the death penalty is disproportionate for the rape of a
child prosecuted in civilian court and for all civilian crimes against
the person that do not result in the death of the victim.17
At its core, Kennedy is a case about relative resulting harms, in
particular the comparative harm between murder and child rape.
But it also raises questions about the authority of the Supreme
Court to judge for itself the gravity of violent crimes against the
person and to rethink the acceptability of severe criminal
punishments for them.
Whether one supports or opposes the death penalty for the
aggravated rape of a child, there can be little doubt that there
remains great value in continuing our national dialogue about
punishment by death. It matters. Kennedy offers a particularly rich
opportunity for dialogue, especially for constitutional and criminal
law scholarship. Consequently, rather than spend much time on the
(admittedly important) substantive question of whether the death
penalty should be permissible for the crime of aggravated child
rape, this Article instead offers three distinct but related normative
observations, leading to one overarching conclusion about the
Kennedy decision and the Court's categorical exemption
jurisprudence. First, Kennedy is essentially a case about
comparative resulting harm among violent crimes. The Kennedy
dissent should have offered a more robust attack on the Court's
two-pronged capital Eighth Amendment methodology, which
12. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
13. Id. at 604 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 2650-51.
15. Id. at 2652-53.
16. Id. at 2659-60.
17. Id. at 2660.
596 [Vol. 69
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undervalues legitimate penological justifications for capital
punishment (particularly retributive ones based on considerations of
harm, both social and individual) and ultimately constitutionalizes
public policy preferences in the form of a kind of judge-made Death
Penalty Code. Under that Code, the Court acts as the ultimate
arbiter of offense seriousness, public morality, and the political
acceptability of capital punishment. Second, the Court's attempt to
limit its holding is illusory. This is so because Kennedy's loose
rhetoric and underdeveloped harm theory could jeopardize the
constitutionality of any statute that permits the imposition of the
death penalty for a non-homicide crime, including crimes against
the state and even unintentional murders that fail to satisfy the
Court's own sensibilities about harm. Finally, Kennedy
demonstrates that there remains both relevance and legitimacy in
the debate over the scope and exercise of judicial power,
particularly when the exercise of judicial power undermines the
community's reasoned response to the problem of violent crime.
Questions about the nature of judicial review are not and ought not
to be mutually exclusive of the substantive debate about the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Ultimately, the Court's
approach to its categorical exemption jurisprudence reflects the
Court's assumption of its role as a kind of modem day tail-
wrapping Minos, not so much fixing punishment, but nonetheless
determining for the Nation the gravity of harm inflicted by a
particular crime and the acceptability of capital punishment for it.
II. KENNEDY, HARM, AND THE FAILURES OF THE CONSENSUS-
INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT METHODOLOGY
Kennedy is premised upon a two-pronged analytical framework
for judging whether to exempt from the imposition of capital
punishment a particular crime or category of offenders. But there is
inherent tension in this approach. The Court has said that it looks
first at objective indicia of public attitudes about the particular
practice at issue (legislative enactments, jury decisions,
prosecutorial practices) to determine whether a national consensus
exists regarding that practice,' 8 but that "in the end, our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment."'
' 9
18. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-67 (2005); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-17 (2002).
19. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977))).
2009]
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These two lines of analysis seem to be incompatible; at a
minimum, one of the prongs is superfluous.
20
With regard to the first prong of this methodology, the
Kennedy opinion traces the historical development of capital rape
statutes, noting that in 1925 eighteen states, the District of
Columbia, and federal law authorized the death penalty for rape.
2 1
After Furman v. Georgia22 invalidated most of these laws, six
states re-enacted capital rape legislation; however, all of those
statutes were subsequently invalidated either by the Court's 1976
capital cases or by state court decisions.23 Louisiana re-enacted its
capital child rape statute in 1995, and Georgia, Montana,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and the military (as part of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice) followed. 4 Comparing this
recent trend to the ones found in Atkins v. Virginia, Roper v.
Simmons,26 and Enmund v. Florida,27 the Court concluded that the
trend was not significant enough to establish a national consensus
favoring the practice. The Court also rejected the contention that
many states specifically declined to enact such legislation not
because the political community opposed it, but because the
legislatures erroneously believed that Coker prohibited the death28
penalty for all rapes, including the rape of a child. Although
Coker contained some ambiguous language, the Court conceded,
when viewed in the appropriate context, that Coker announced a
20. See Broughton, supra note 6, at 651.
21. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2651.
22. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
23. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2651.
24. Id. Again, the Court originally failed to cite the UCMJ provision,
section 552(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006. See id. at
2653 n. Justice Kennedy's separate statement regarding the denial of rehearing,
however, argued that the UCMJ provision was not relevant to the Court's
national consensus analysis, which was limited to the civilian law context. Id.
(statement of Kennedy, J.).
25. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). At the time of the Atkins decision, eighteen capital
jurisdictions forbade the death penalty for the mentally retarded, and twenty
permitted it.
26. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). At the time of the Roper decision, eighteen capital
jurisdictions forbade the death penalty for juvenile offenders, and twenty
permitted it.
27. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). At the time of the Enmund decision, eight
jurisdictions permitted the death penalty for participation in a robbery that
resulted in a murder committed by an accomplice. Enmund's rule was
subsequently modified by Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), which held
that the culpability mandate of Edmund could be satisfied where the offender
engages in major participation in a felony and demonstrates reckless
indifference to human life.
28. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2653-56.
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more limited holding, applying only to the rape of an adult
woman.
2 9
Kennedy completes its national consensus analysis by stating
that positive legislation is not the only indicia of societal attitudes
toward the execution of child rapists.30 In addition, the Court
explains, it matters that no one has been executed for the rape of an
adult or a child since 1964, and no one has been executed for a
non-homicide offense since 1963. 3 1 Kennedy and Richard Davis
(who was also recently convicted in Louisiana for the aggravated
rape of a child) were the only two people currently on death row in
the Nation for non-homicide crimes. 32 Consequently, the Court
concludes, when these figures are combined with the paucity of
state or federal legislation making the rape of a child a capital
crime, there is a national consensus against capital punishment for
child rape.
33
Then, in part IV of the Court's opinion, Justice Kennedy
explains that the analysis of the objective indicia of societal
attitudes related to the capital punishment of child rapists is but a
starting point, and not a dispositive basis for decision. Rather, "in
the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question
of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment., 34 As applied in Kennedy, this is essentially a
proportionality analysis that depends upon a comparison between
the harms caused by murder and child rape.
Although the Kennedy Court (unlike the Coker Court) does not
attempt to minimize the individual harms inflicted by the rape of a
child--"the attack was not just on [the victim] but on her
childhood,"35 "[r]ape has a permanent psychological, emotional,
and sometimes physical impact on the child," 6 "[w]e cannot
dismiss the years of long anguish that must be endured by the
victim of child rape"37-Kennedy nevertheless concludes, as did
29. Id. at 2654 ("Confined to [the Coker passage about rape generally]
Coker's analysis of the Eighth Amendment is susceptible of a reading that
would prohibit making child rape a capital offense. In context, however, Coker's
holding was narrower than some of its language read in isolation.").
30. Id. at 2657.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2657-58.
34. Id. at 2658 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. Others have discussed the harm done by rape, particularly child rape,
and I have been critical of the Coker Court's minimization of those harms. See
SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (Harvard Univ. Press 1987); Broughton, supra note
2009] 599
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Coker, that rape (like all non-homicide crimes against the person)
does not compare with murder in terms of the individual harm it
produces.38 The relevant distinction concerns the taking of a
human life, an act that the Court deems unique in terms of
"severity and irrevocability." 39 Here the Court does not hesitate to
follow Coker's reasoning, explaining that jt]he murderer kills; the
rapist, if no more than that, does not ....' , The Court defends its
proportionality analysis by noting the significance of "the number
of executions that would be allowed" if the Court followed
Louisiana's approach.4' The Court explains that child rape occurs
more than first-degree murder and thus could be punished with
death more often." Therefore, it would be inconsistent with the
Nation's evolving standards of decency and the Court's avowed
mission to limit the use of capital punishment to allow the death
penalty for child rape.43 The Court concludes its excessiveness
discussion by explaining why its conclusion is consistent with the
retributive and deterrent goals of punishment.
44
In response, Justice Alito's Kennedy dissent is persuasive on
many fronts. It offers a compelling response to the majority's
national consensus analysis and demonstrates why capital child
rape legislation can just as adequately narrow the class of death-
eligible offenders as statutory sentencing procedures for capital
murder. 45 Justice Alito demonstrates that a number of state courts
and legislators actually read or could have read Coker to apply to
all rapes, not merely to the rape of an adult woman. 46 Providing
examples from a number of jurisdictions, he concludes, "the Coker
dicta gave state legislatures a strong incentive not to push for the
enactment of new capital child-rape laws even though these
legislators and their constituents may have believed that the laws
would be appropriate and desirable. ' 47 He also notes that in the
five additional jurisdictions that were considering capital child rape
9, at 35-38; Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward
Explanation and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REv. 827 (1999).
38. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659-60.
39. Id. at 2659, 2660 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 598).
40. Id. at 2654 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 598). The Coker dissent rejected
the plurality's understanding of the harm caused by rape. See Coker, 433 U.S. at
611-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
41. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2662-64.
45. Id. at 2665-71, 2673-74 (Alito, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 2665-71.
47. Id. at 2668.
600 [Vol. 69
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legislation recently but failed to enact it; such failure occurred only
after the grant of certiorari in Kennedy, and nothing in the record
indicates that the legislatures refused to pass the legislation
because they viewed it as offensive to social standards of
decency. Although Justice Alito is reluctant to conclude that a
national consensus unquestionably exists in favor of the practice of
imposing the death penalty for child rape, he nonetheless
acknowledges that society's moral standards could be evolving
toward harsher punishment for child rapists, not away from it."
The Court, though, deprives the democratic process of its capacity
for demonstrating whether our society desires a move in that
direction.
The Alito dissent mirrors the Coker dissent insofar as it accepts
both broader retributive and utilitarian justifications for capital
child rape statutes. Both Coker and Kennedy, though, assert what
appear to be primarily retributive bases for applying a categorical
exemption for the respective rapes in those cases based on a
finding of disproportionality, though the harm analysis adds a
touch of utilitarianism.50 However, the retributive theory of
Kennedy and Coker (indeed, the Court's entire proportionality
theory in these cases) is arguably too narrow.51 Moreover, even if
48. Id. at 2671.
49. Id. at 2672-73.
50. My own sense is that Kennedy and Coker remain primarily retributive.
The harm assessment is prominent but does not really concern the prevention of
future harm (classical deterrence)--rather, it is an evaluation of how the harm
caused relates to the offender's deserved punishment. This has led to a
description of the Court's capital proportionality jurisprudence as "limiting
retributivism." See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences,
Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to
What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 591 (2005); Richard S. Frase, The Warren
Court's Missed Opportunities in Substantive Criminal Law, 3 OHIO ST. J. GRIM.
L. 75, 96 (2005). See also NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
182-87, 196-202 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1982) (explaining the principle of
"limiting retributivism" as recognizing an outer limit on desert).
Alice Ristroph has argued for an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that
is based on principles of proportionality, but concedes that proportionality is not
derived solely or necessarily from retribution. See Alice Ristroph,
Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DuKE L.J. 263 (2005).
Paul Robinson has also written about the efficacy of hybrid approaches to
distributing punishment. See Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the
Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 19 (1987).
51. See Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 50, at 588-97
(examining the Court's proportionality jurisprudence under the Eighth
Amendment and offering distinct theories of proportionality, concluding that the
Court's capital cases tend to employ a "limiting retributivism" understanding of
proportionality); Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion
in the Supreme Court's Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
2009]
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we assume that the Court's proportionality principle is exclusively
or primarily retributive and put aside the utilitarian and
consequentialist justifications for capital child rape legislation that
the Court undervalues but that could well form a basis for the
legislation, we err if we underestimate the retributive argument to
be made here in favor of the Louisiana statute. Justice Alito
implies (correctly, I think) that the moral culpability and
blameworthiness of a child rapist like Patrick Kennedy are
adequate to support not just criminal responsibility but severe
punishment as well. 52 The objection from retributivist quarters-
and the one that Justice Kennedy's opinion employs, like Justice
White's Coker opinion-would be that the rape of a child where
death does not result produces less harm than murder and therefore
justifies lesser punishment because the offender's moral desert is
lessened; that is, rape fails to approximate the harm produced by
murder, a standard retributive objection based on calculations of
proportionality. 53 But one plausible response is that child rape
simply produces a different kind of harm than murder; its
magnitude, combined with the moral blameworthiness of the child
rapist, is still sufficient to employ capital punishment as a just
desert. Just as not all harms resulting from violent crime are of the
same magnitude, neither are they of the same genus. There is no
textual, historical, structural, or precedential basis for concluding
that the Eighth Amendment constitutionalizes only one kind of
REV. 1151 (2003) (exploring the use of retributivism and other punishment
theories in the Court's capital cases). Cf Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death
Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67 (1992) (discussing retributivism in the
context of the Court's guided discretion jurisprudence); Alice Ristroph, Desert,
Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293,
1301-02 (2006) (discussing "limiting retibutivism" as a method for reconciling
retribution and utilitarianism and indicating the view of others that Roper and
Atkins are examples of the Court's use of limiting retributivism); Paul H.
Robinson, The A.L.I.'s Proposed Distributive Principle of "Limiting
Retributivism ": Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other than Pure Desert, 7
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 10-12 (2003) (expressing doubts about using desert as a
limiting principle).
52. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2676 (Alito, J., dissenting). See also Douglas A.
Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital Emotions, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 355, 361 (2008) (considering the role of emotion in capital
sentencing and stating that "a strict ranking of murder as eclipsing all rapes,
even child rapes, is emotionally tone deaf," giving reasons why child rape may
present an emotionally stronger case for capital punishment).
53. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe is
Ready to Strike, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 85, 134 (1993) (arguing that for retributivists,
"the taking of a human life, and only the taking of a human life, deserves the
imposition of the death penalty").
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harm in determining whether a legally-authorized punishment is
excessive-if it did, the Court would have to acknowledge the
invalidity of capital sentences for treason and espionage that do not
result in death. The Kennedy majority thus wrongly assumes that
the taking of a life is the only kind of harm that the Eighth
Amendment recognizes as justifying the legislative provision for
the death penalty for a crime against the person.
Another response is that, even if we assume, as Justice
Kennedy does and as the Coker Court did, that the magnitude of
the harm from aggravated child rape is less than that of a murder,
this does not answer the question of whether it nevertheless has
reached the threshold for harm (and culpability) that justifies the
possibility of imposing the death penalty. On this theory, the death
penalty could still be proportionate for an aggravated child rape
that reaches a certain threshold level of harm necessary for capital
punishment, even if a murder ranks slightly higher on the sliding
scale of harm. This of course would require the state to
demonstrate why a specific incident of child rape or a particular
child rapist is so aggravated and the offender so deserving that the
case has crossed the threshold that should be required for capital
punishment; but again, Justice Alito adequately explains why
principles of aggravation and procedures for considering it could
apply as easily in a child rape proceeding as in a murder
proceeding. 54 Therefore, there remains a plausible harm-
retributivist argument for preserving the option of capital
punishment in particularly aggravated cases of child rape. The
Kennedy majority thus devalues the force of retributivism (not to
mention the remaining, largely ignored principles of deterrence
and incapacitation) by assuming a one-size-fits-all approach to
evaluating harm for purposes of Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis.
Despite its strengths, however, the dissent fails to adequately
challenge the structural integrity of the two-pronged framework
and, in particular, the political neutrality of the "independent
judgment" rationale. If the objective indicia disfavor a particular
practice, then why does the Court's independent judgment matter?
More importantly, if the Court's independent judgment is the
ultimate trump card, why even bother considering the objective
indicia in the first place? Indeed, it is this latter question that
appears most appropriate because it is the Court's own judgment
about the "acceptability" of the death penalty that seems to be
54. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2673-74 (Alito, J., dissenting).
2009]
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govemin in cases like Atkins," Roper,16 Coker,57 and now
Kennedy. 8
If the Court was serious about looking to objective indicia of
societal attitudes (and there is, as I have explained, some reason to
question whether the Court is truly serious about that enterprise),59
then the Court should have accounted for the many non-homicide
capital statutes in force before Kennedy that would be
constitutional when viewed at a moderate level of abstraction:
about 40% of death penalty jurisdictions (fifteen out of thirty-
seven) have enacted such legislation, and seven out of thirty-seven
(just under 20%) enacted capital child rape statutes in recent
years. 60 If the Court was serious about using persistent changes or
trends in capital legislation as the standard for measuring a national
consensus favoring or disfavoring a particular practice (a dubious
measurement, but one now firmly established),61 then it should
have at least recognized the moral significance of the national
trend in recent years toward the preservation or adoption of non-
death-resulting capital legislation, not its abolition (and this is
especially true of capital child rape legislation).62 Instead,
however, the Court found not that such a trend did not exist-
indeed, Justice Alito's dissent persuasively demonstrated the
"potential emergence of a national consensus in favor of permitting
the death penalty for child rape;" rather, the trend was simply not
55. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (creating a categorical exemption for the mentally
retarded).
56. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (creating a categorical exemption for offenders under
age 18).
57. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (creating a categorical exemption for persons who
rape an adult woman).
58. See Broughton, supra note 6, at 651 (discussing the incompatibility of
the two-prongs).
59. See id. at 647-51.
60. The Louisiana Supreme Court, unlike the United States Supreme Court,
fully considered the other non-homicide capital crimes in conducting its own
analysis. See State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757, 785-88 (La. 2007), rev'd, 128
S. Ct. 2641 (2008). Although the Louisiana Supreme Court identifies thirty-
eight death penalty jurisdictions, since the time of the Kennedy state court
decision (May 22, 2007), New Jersey has abolished its death penalty. See New
Jersey Abolishes Death Penalty, CBSNews.com, Dec, 17, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews. com/stories/2007/12/17/national/main3624792.shtml. New
Jersey did not, however, punish any non-homicide offenses by death.
The United States Supreme Court, though, limited its national consensus
analysis to civilian criminal law. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343, slip op.
at 3-4 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2008) (statement of Kennedy, J.).
61. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
62. See J. Richard Broughton, Off the Rails on a Crazy Train? The
Structural Consequences of Atkins and Modern Death Penalty Jurisprudence,
11 WIDENER L. REv. 1, 8 (2004).
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as significant as that found in Atkins and Roper. Society's moral
evolution is constitutionally treated as a one-way ratchet-that is,
away from the use of capital punishment-though this is the very
kind of ratchet that the Court has previously said did not exist in its
Eighth Amendment review.
63
But even if we assume the integrity of the Court's national
consensus conclusion, it appears not to ultimately matter-either in
Kennedy or in the Court's other categorical prohibition cases-
because the "Constitution contemplates" (where?) that the Court's
independent judgment about the acceptability of the death penalty
must ultimately govern, a proposition that the Alito dissent should
have more directly questioned.6
Kennedy suggests that whether the death penalty for child rape
would be "acceptable" to the Court depends upon the relative harm
caused by rape in comparison to murder. And yet (as Justice Alito
points out, too) the Court's opinion forbids capital punishment no
matter how brutal the rape and no matter how much harm to the
child victim a particular rape might produce.6 5 In this sense, the
Kennedy majority undervalues both the potential individual harm
that child rape causes and the legislature's recognition of this
reality. But the opinion, focused as it is on individual harm, also
ignores the social harms produced by child rape. The majority
acknowledges the revulsion of jurors at the child rapist and his
moral depravity but fails to adequately address the social harm to
the political community that attends child rape (indeed, all violent
crime).66 In addition, the Court's concern about the number of
executions that "would be allowed under [Louisiana's] approach"
is a curious contradiction. 67 Earlier, in its national consensus
analysis, the Court found it significant that despite the existence of
capital rape legislation, no one had been executed for this crime
since 1964, and no one has been executed for any non-homicide
crime since 1963.68 If these statistics mean anything, they
63. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (joint opinion). See
also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990 (1991) (stating that "[t]he Eighth
Amendment is not a ratchet ... disabling States from giving effect to altered
beliefs and responding to changed social conditions").
64. In his statement concerning the denial of rehearing, Justice Scalia argues
that at the time of its adoption, the Eighth Amendment "would have been laughed
to scorn if it had read 'no criminal penalty shall be imposed which the Supreme
Court deems unacceptable.' But that is what the majority opinion said . .. ."
Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343, slip op. at 3 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2008) (statement of
Scalia, J.).
65. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2665 (Alito, J., dissenting).
66. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
67. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660.
68. Id. at 2657.
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presumably mean that the mere existence of capital rape legislation
is no guarantee that death sentences or executions will follow. And
yet, in defending its determination that the death penalty is
excessive for aggravated child rape, the Court concludes that our
evolving standards of decency would be offended by the high
number of executions that would be permitted by the mere
existence of capital child rape legislation.69 This inconsistency is
exacerbated by the Court's acknowledgement that the potentially
high number of death sentences and executions for capital child
rape would offend the Court's unembarrassed desire to limit the
use of the death penalty.
But therein lay precisely the kind of internal contradiction that
plagues the Court's Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence: why
is the death penalty for child rape-or for any crime-
disproportionate merely because it may be imposed with some
frequency? Indeed, as a matter of textual interpretation, does not
the Court's national consensus analysis assume that the "unusual"
language of the Eighth Amendment is better satisfied when a
punishment is imposed infrequently? The contradiction here
suggests perhaps that the Court means only that the death penalty
cannot be imposed too often or too seldom, but this begs the
question as to what precise level of frequency the Eighth
Amendment demands or forbids. One would have thought that the
purpose of the Court's narrowing jurisprudence was chiefly to
address overuse, to constrain the government in its employment of
the death penalty by limiting the class of death-eligible offenders,
even those whose offense falls unquestionably into a category of
offenses for which the death penalty is permissible, such as
murderers. But the Court's categorical exemption cases
demonstrate what appears to be its own distrust of the very
narrowing procedures that it has otherwise mandated.7 ° And,
consistent with this distrust of the ability of jurors to meaningfully
distinguish the most culpable and deserving defendants, the
69. Id. at 2660.
70. For example, the jury must have an adequate vehicle for considering
and giving effect to mental deficiency as a mitigating factor, but apparently
cannot be trusted to give effect to the diminished culpability of the mentally
retarded, so a categorical exemption must apply for this category of offenders to
ensure that a disproportionate punishment is not imposed upon them. Compare
Penry v. Johnson (Penry 1), 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) with Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Youth is a valid mitigating factor that must be within
the jury's reach, but a categorical exemption must apply for those under age
eighteen who kill because, apparently, juries cannot be trusted to distinguish the
levels of culpability among sixteen- and seventeen-year-old murderers. Compare
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 578-79 (2005).
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Kennedy Court of course rejects the application of narrowing
factors in the context of a capital child rape proceeding, even
apparently conceding the distrust I describe: according to the
Court, narrowing factors are not useful in the child rape context
because "[i]n this context, which involves a crime that in many
cases will overwhelm a decent person's judgment, we have no
confidence that the imposition of the death penalty would not be so
arbitrary as to be 'freakis[h]."' 71 But the Court makes this
determination only because-only because-the capital child rape
victim did not die.72 This distinction, as I have explained here,
lacks coherence, and the Court fails to explain why this distinction
is relevant to the State's ability to employ a scheme of aggravation
and mitigation to constrain its imposition of the death penalty.
More importantly, where and why does the Eighth Amendment
insist that it is the Supreme Court's responsibility to limit the use
of a particular penal sanction by employing a particular
punishment theory? Aside from mere reference to the "in-the-end-
the-Constitution-says-that-it-is-for-us-to-decide" rhetoric culled
from Coker and merely blindly repeated in case after case with no
further explanation of its origin or its structural limits, the Court
does not tell us. The Court does not explain-in Kennedy or
elsewhere-why its moral intuition matters more than that of the
political actors in those states that have adopted capital child rape
legislation, who have debated and enacted this legislation based on
their own considerations about the gravity of the offense and the
experiences of their communities. Nor does the Court explain why
"decency" requires greater and greater restrictions on the use of
capital punishment; decency and moral progress could, it is at least
arguable, require harsher punishments for crimes that are highly
aggravated and that produce great individual and social harm, even
if they do not result in death. The Court's narrow subjective
proportionality analysis is one plausible approach; however, it is
only one, and the Court does not demonstrate why the Constitution
favors the Court's approach above all others. Indeed, this may be
especially problematic with regard to retributive desert, which is
informed by the moral sensibilities of the community that can
better be given meaning and expression by their political
representatives. 73 The Court largely ignores other legitimate
71. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660-61 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
72. Id. at 2661 (rejecting application of aggravating and mitigating factors
in child rape proceedings because individual harm cannot be quantified where
death does not result).
73. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715,
734 (2005) (recognizing that agencies may not be better at assessing just deserts
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punishment theories that political actors could adopt in responding
to the harms caused by child rape and the moral blameworthiness
of the child rapist.
74
In Dantean terms, the Court's "independent judgment" would
have us believe that the child rapist belongs with the lustful in the
Second Circle where the damned are forever ensnared in a violent
storm.75 But could Minos not also legitimately place the child
rapists in the Seventh Circle with those who committed violence
against their neighbors, whose souls boil in Phlegethon, a river of
blood; or even lower in the Circle of Violence, with those who
have committed violence against Nature; or perhaps even the first
tier (Caina) of the lowest Circle of the Malebolge, with those who
committed treachery against their kin, damned to have their heads
bent downward and frozen in a lake of ice? 76 It is not clear that the
Court's assessment of the harm here is the only or the correct one,
than legislators "because legislators represent the moral views of a broader
constituency."); Ristroph, supra note 51, at 1325-26 (despite the desirability of
limits on majoritarian judgments about criminal punishment, "desert seems a
poor avenue through which to limit the power to punish .... Desert is widely
recognized as a subjective and moral notion, and thus within the province of the
people rather than legal experts.").
74. See Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 50, at 600-01 (briefly
assessing whether there could exist a utilitarian alternative to the Court's
retributive proportionality approach); Sigler, supra note 51, at 1154-61
(discussing the plausible alternatives to retribution as potential justifications for
capital punishment). The Court does add a discussion of why it believes its
conclusion is consistent with retributive and deterrence theories generally, but
this discussion is of little comfort. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2661-62. It comes
only after the Court has deployed its limited harm theory to render the death
sentence here excessive, and thus reveals itself to be more of an afterthought
than a primary basis for the proportionality assessment.
75. See DANTE, supra note 1, at 42-47. The effort to place the child rapists
in any particular Circle of Dante's Hell is bound to be imperfect. But it seems, to
me, the child rapist would be especially ill-suited for the circle of the lustful,
whose souls do not appear to have been guilty of any violence. It is not
unreasonable to feel sympathy for some in this Circle. Indeed, the figure of
Francesca Da Rimini in the Second Circle is one of the most compelling in the
Inferno, causing Dante's Pilgrim to be so overcome by her story of passion for
her lover that the Pilgrim faints. Id. at 47. For an excellent essay on Francesca,
see Mark Musa, Behold Francesca Who Speaks So Well, in DANTE's INFERNO:
THE INDIANA CRITICAL EDITION 310-24 (Mark Musa trans. & ed., 1995).
76. DANTE, supra note 1, at 105-11, 133-39, 293-99. The Malebranche
("Evil Claws") are the demons who oversee this portion of Hell. See id. at 187-
89. Again, the theoretical placement of child rapists in the Inferno is necessarily
imperfect-the circles of violence and treachery contained the souls of those
who murdered. But my point here is that it would not be implausible or
unreasonable to conclude that the violence of child rape is deserving of
punishment more like that of other violent actors.
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nor is it clear why the Court's assessment is constitutionally
entitled to greater weight than that of the political community
acting through its representatives. At a minimum, the political
community ought to have the opportunity to effectuate such a
judgment through its criminal laws and to determine on its own
whether a serious, violent crime has resulted in enough personal
and community harm to justify the death penalty, unimpeded by
judicial second-guessing except where the legislature acts with no
plausible, rational basis for that punishment. But such a sensible
regime is not possible in a world governed by the omniscient moral
judgment of five Supreme Court Justices.
The language could not be starker. As the Court said in Atkins,
"[W]e shall first review the judgment of legislatures that have
addressed the suitability of imposing the death penalty on the
mentally retarded, and then consider reasons for agreeing or
disagreeing with their judgment., 78 What is couched as a
straightforward proportionality analysis appears to be an
exposition on the lack of wisdom in imposing the death penalty for
aggravated child rape as a matter of public policy. To be sure,
Justice Alito's Kennedy dissent confronts this reality: the Court
defends its excessiveness rationale by saying, among other things,
that the death penalty is not "in the best interests of the victims" of
child rape, that the death penalty for child rape could create
procedural difficulties in a particular case, and that the victim's
testimony may be unreliable. 79 As Justice Alito explains, these
may be acceptable political arguments for refusing to impose the
death penalty for child rape, but it is difficult to see how these
arguments are relevant to the Eighth Amendment's meaning or its
application to capital child rape legislation. The Alito dissent,
though, neglects to confront the structural inconsistency of the
77. Michael Perry, who rejects capital punishment on human rights theory,
has discussed whether this kind of Thayerian deference is nonetheless desirable
in the capital punishment arena. See Michael J. Perry, Is Capital Punishment
Unconstitutional? And Even If We Think It Is, Should We Want the Supreme
Court to So Rule?, 41 GA. L. REv. 867, 898-902 (2007). See also James B.
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893) (explaining why the Supreme Court should act
deferentially when asked to articulate constitutional norms). Jim Liebman has
written about the different levels of intrusiveness in the Court's death penalty
cases. See James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing With Death: The Supreme Court
and Capital Punishment, 1963-2006, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14-16 (2007).
78. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002). See also Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (repeating that the Court has returned to the
practice of exercising its own independent judgment in determining the
propriety of the death penalty).
79. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2673-74 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Court's methodology or the origins of its assertion of power to
determine the "acceptability" of a particular death penalty practice.
The Court's statement that it reads the Constitution as
empowering the Court to render its own independent judgment
about the acceptability of the death penalty-the decision to agree
or disagree with the policy choices of the legislature, a judgment
that in practice has become unbounded-is a remarkable one,
which clarifies the breadth of the judicial role that the Court has
assumed in these cases. Yet it has largely escaped public
attention.80 If one were looking for the doctrinal key to the Court's
asserted power to dictate and constitutionalize a Death Penalty
Code for the Nation-to wrap its tail as a constitutional Minos,
judging for itself the gravity of the sin and the acceptability of a
given punishment-it is contained in these passages.
III. KENNEDY, HARM, AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR OTHER CRIMES
AND CRIMINALS
Kennedy certainly fits into the categorical bar jurisprudence
developed in Atkins, Roper, Coker, and even Enmund. The
methodology of these cases is virtually identical (though Coker
was decided before the "national consensus" nomenclature gained
common usage). A careful study of these cases, though, reveals an
important difference among them-while the first prong of the
categorical bar approach is similar in each case, the second prong
as applied in Kennedy and Coker is ultimately about judging
harms. That harm analysis raises serious question about both the
Court's methodology (addressed in Part II) and Kennedy's
consequences.
Although each of the aforementioned cases is a categorical
exemption case, Atkins and Roper assert a bar based on the
physical characteristics of the offender at issue and focus the
proportionality inquiry on the offender's reduced culpability;
Kennedy and Coker assert a bar based on the kind of crime that the
defendant committed and focus upon the gravity of the harm each
80. But see Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term, Foreword:
A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REv. 31, 46-47 (2005) (explaining that, in
Roper, the Court's judgment was akin to that of a legislative body); Benjamin
Wittes, What Is "Cruel and Unusual?", 134 POL'Y REv. 15, 16-20 (2005)
(explaining that the Court's Eighth Amendment cases are marked by "rank
subjectivity"). Cf Dora W. Klein, Categorical Exclusions from Capital
Punishment: How Many Wrongs Make a Right?, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1211
(2007) (questioning whether the rationales of Atkins and Roper have made the
death penalty more just).
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offense causes. 8 1 Indeed, one arguably could include Enmund and
Tison, at least partially, in this category of cases because although
the Enmund-Tison rule was crafted for a particular kind of offense
(felony murder), the rule also directs us to the state of mind of the
individual defendant and, as a consequence, his moral culpability
for his acts (which under this rule is lessened the more attenuated
the defendant's participation).82 Enmund and Tison are thus a kind
of hybrid. In Kennedy and Coker, though, the offender remains
highly (indeed, ultimately) culpable and blameworthy. Even if it is
possible to feel some sympathy for defendants like Darryl Atkins
and Christopher Simmons, no such sympathy attaches to
defendants like Patrick Kennedy and Ehrlich Coker.83 The death
penalty thus is unacceptable under the Eighth Amendment, the
Court tells us, not because the criminal actor is insufficiently
morally blameworthy but because, despite his moral
blameworthiness, his act, or more precisely, the individual harm
resulting from it, is insufficiently serious to warrant capital
punishment. 84 Why? Because no death has occurred, the Court
concludes.85 Comparative harm to the victim, as judged by the
Court, then, is the linchpin of the Kennedy majority's
proportionality analysis.
This leads to my next observation about Kennedy, which is that
it creates an inevitable route for challenge to all manner of crimes
that do not result in death. Kennedy exempts not just the crime of
aggravated child rape (by civilians, at least) but all non-homicide
crimes against the person 86-not because a national consensus
exists against imposing the death penalty for those crimes (the
81. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659-60; Coker, 433 U.S. at 598; Atkins,
536 U.S. at 318; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
82. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982).
83. One wonders whether Simmons, despite his youth, was such a
sympathetic figure. Simmons admitted that he wanted to kill someone and
boasted after killing Shirley Crook by binding her hands and feet and throwing
her off of a railroad trestle. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556-57. He had substantially
planned the crime and executed it practically as he envisioned. Id. at 556.
84. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660. Note that Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Enmund criticized the Court for failing to explain why the Eighth Amendment
rejects "standards of blameworthiness based on other levels of intent" or
blameworthiness based on the harm that resulted from Enmund's acts in
participating in the armed robbery. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 824-25 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). For an excellent discussion of whether social harm or the
culpable act should be the central organizing principle of the criminal law, see
Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1
(1994) (arguing for centrality of the culpable act).
85. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660.
86. Id. at 2659-60.
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Court offers no evidence or analysis to support that proposition),
but simply because they do not result in death and thus do not
produce sufficient individual harm for capital punishment to be a
permissible response from the political community. Kennedy says
its rule is a straightforward one: no hidden agenda here. The
majority states clearly that it is not addressing whether the death
penalty is permissible for "crimes against the state" such as
treason, espionage, and drug kingpin activity (which, strangely, the
Court considers an offense against the state).87 But the majority
gives us no reason as to why these crimes would not also be
subject to the categorical bar if the ultimate standard is whether
they compare with murder in terms of moral depravity (which
appears to be defined simply in terms of the resulting individual
harm, the taking of a life). As explained earlier, if the harm that is
relevant to the categorical exemption analysis is not limited to the
specific kind of harm that the individual experiences when a
murder occurs (severity beyond mere graveness, combined with
irrevocability), then there is ample reason to believe that other
non-homicide offenses could produce harm of sufficient magnitude
to justify capital punishment. But if this is true, then the Kennedy
Court should have more carefully articulated its harm principle in
exempting child rape and other non-homicide crimes. The
impression that the analysis leaves is that the kind of individual
harm resulting from murder is the only standard of harm that the
Eighth Amendment contemplates for proportionality purposes
when capital punishment is at issue. The only distinction that
Kennedy makes between treason, espionage, and drug kingpin
activity on the one hand and non-homicide crimes like child rape
on the other hand is that the former are "crimes against the state."
89
But this tells us precisely nothing about whether or why the former
crimes produce harms sufficient to justify the death penalty, and
the latter do not.
90
87. Id. at 2659. For the federal drug kingpin law, see 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)
(2006). Section 3591(b) does not require a culpable act that results in death. Cf
id. § 3591(a). The capital sentencing proceeding for a drug kingpin offense is
governed by section 3592(d), the aggravating factors for which do not require a
death to result from the act.
88. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659-60.
89. Id. at 2659. Indeed, the literature already contains arguments against the
constitutionality of the death penalty for crimes against the state like treason and
espionage. See Ryan Norwood, None Dare Call It Treason: The Constitutionality
of the Death Penalty for Peacetime Espionage, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 820 (2002);
James G. Wilson, Chaining the Leviathan: The Unconstitutionality of Executing
Those Convicted of Treason, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 99 (1983).
90. The same can be said of the Court's late effort to distinguish the death
penalty for child rape under military law. Justice Kennedy's statement
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Of course, "crimes against the state" involve serious social
harms created by the threat to the government and to national
institutions responsible for the security of the political community.
But it is wrong to assume that crimes against the person do not also
produce social harm or to ignore such social harm because it is not
expressed in precisely the same way as the social harm resulting
from a crime against the state.91 Had the Court acknowledged the
realities of social harm resulting from serious, violent crimes
against the person-for example, undermining the community's
sense of security, creating fear in the community-it would have
been compelled to combine that harm with the substantial
individual harm caused by aggravated child rape and with the
moral culpability of the child rapist.92 Moreover, the Court would
be compelled to conclude that its effort to "independently judge"
the gravity of an offense is more complicated than a simple
quantification of personal injury. The distinction between crimes
against the state and crimes against the person, while legitimate on
its face, becomes more complicated when that distinction is used
simply to justify differing treatments in Eighth Amendment capital
proportionality analysis. The Court avoids this complication by
avoiding an assessment of social harm altogether.
The Court's effort to limit its holding also involves some
sleight of hand. While the Court tells us that its holding is narrow
in that it is not addressing the constitutionality of capital
punishment for crimes against the state, it nonetheless invalidates
concerning the denial of rehearing appears to limit the Court's holding to
civilian child rape defendants, but it is useful to ask, as Justice Scalia does in
response, whether the distinction matters, at least with regard to child rape. See
Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343, slip. op. at 3 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2008) (statement
of Scalia, J.) ("It is difficult to imagine, however, how rape of a child could
sometimes be deserving of death for a soldier but never for a civilian.").
91. Joshua Dressier has persuasively discussed the social harm that is
important to the finding of criminal responsibility. See Joshua Dressler,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 120-22 (4th ed. 2006). See also Albin Eser,
The Principle of "Harm " in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of
the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REv. 345 (1965) (discussing
social harms and the criminal law).
92. In cases of aggravated child rape, the Court need not choose between a
culpability principle and a harm principle in assessing the offender's desert-
both exist here. Cf Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of
Wrongdoing, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 237-38 (1994) (arguing that
wrongdoing, which is a culpable act that causes harm, can enhance the
offender's desert as a retributive matter, though harm is not a necessary or
sufficient condition for punishability, but culpability is). See also Alexander,
supra note 84, at 17-23 (offering a critique of social harm theories).
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statutes for all non-homicide capital crimes against the person. 93
Yet the Court's national consensus analysis does not account for
the extensive number of these latter crimes, thus leading us to
wonder why (if) the other non-homicide capital crimes against the
person did not satisfy the national consensus analysis. As
explained earlier, if the scope of the asserted governmental power
is framed at a moderate level of abstraction-as the power to
impose the death penalty for a serious crime of violence that does
not result in the death of the victim-then one would imagine that
the Court's national consensus analysis could look very different,
as about 40% of death penalty jurisdictions have enacted
legislation of this kind.94 But the Court frames the issue at the
narrowest level of generality-as the power to impose the death
penalty for the rape of a child-and thus finds that no national
consensus or trend of the kind that the Court found significant in
Atkins and Roper existed to justify the Louisiana statute. Further,
the Court excludes military law from its analysis. In this way, the
Court frames the issue before it at a narrow level of generality for
purposes of conducting its national consensus analysis yet
broadens the level of generality when conducting its subjective
proportionality analysis, holding that no non-homicide crimes
against the person can be punished by death.
Consider also the loose language that Justice Kennedy employs
in saying that the death penalty is disproportionate for someone
who does not kill or intend to assist another in killing the rape
victim.95 This language appears as if it was designed to make the
holding here consistent with the rule of Enmund, which concluded
that the death penalty is proportionate for anyone who kills,96
attempts to kill, or intends to kill. Perhaps Justice Kennedy leaves
an opening to legislators to craft new capital child rape legislation
that provides for capital punishment where there is evidence that
the defendant intended that the victim be killed but the killing was
unsuccessful. The problem, however, is obvious: if the ultimate
measure of proportionality is the individual harm done by murder
(i.e., that it results in the taking of a life)-which is, the Court tells
us, uniquely different from crimes where death does not result-
then one must wonder whether the harm that the Court deems
sufficient for the imposition of capital punishment is produced
93. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659-60.
94. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. See also State v. Kennedy,
957 So. 2d 757, 779-91 (La. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (reviewing
non-homicide capital crimes throughout the country).
95. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650-51.
96. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
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even by the intended, but unsuccessful, killing of a child rape
victim. Despite Justice Kennedy's "did not intend to assist another
in killing" language, the Court uses other language to suggest that
the harm from an intended but unsuccessful killing is not adequate
for the imposition of capital punishment-for example, when the
Court describes the "severity and irrevocability" of murder as
helping to establish its unique harm. 9
7
This ambiguity could prove appealing to prosecutors and
legislators who may wish to seize upon this language to provide
for capital punishment where the government can demonstrate the
defendant's intent to kill a child rape victim even if the defendant
is unsuccessful. The argument to be made here is that such a
defendant bears a higher degree of moral culpability and
blameworthiness than someone who rapes with no intent to kill,
that such a crime creates even greater social harm, that Enmund
clearly contemplates an available death penalty for one who
intends to participate in a murder, and that Tison permits
imposition of the death penalty where there is major participation
and reckless indifference to human life. Still, as previously stated,
Kennedy was not really about relative culpability-even a
committed abolitionist could easily acknowledge Patrick
Kennedy's high degree of moral culpability or blameworthiness;
rather, Kennedy is chiefly about the comparative resulting
individual harm between murder and rape and the Court's
(erroneous) conclusion that, at least for crimes against the person,
nothing else compares to the taking of a life. Thus, after Kennedy,
the argument for capital punishment where there is evidence of an
intent to kill would have to establish that an intended but
unsuccessful killing results in individual harm (and, it should be
included, social harm) comparable to a successful one. Perhaps this
is an opening for the legislature, but an unfortunately narrow one.
Compare this language of intent, which seems to give some
legitimacy to capital punishment where there is an intent to kill,
with Justice Kennedy's use of the word "intentional" to describe
the kind of murder for which the death penalty remains
proportionate. 98 Justice Kennedy explains, "we conclude that, in
determining whether the death penalty is excessive, there is a
distinction between intentional first-degree murder on the one
hand, and nonhomicide [sic] crimes against individual persons,
even including child rape, on the other." 9 But between these two
extremes lies a vast territory of serious homicides that, though
97. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660.
98. See id.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
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unintentional, produce great harm, social and individual, and
unquestionably involve a high degree of moral culpability. For
example, consider the Federal Government's pending capital
prosecution of Naeem Williams in Hawaii. After months of
persistent degradation and abuse of his daughter, the Government
alleges, Williams ultimately killed her with a severe blow to her
body, then delayed in contacting medical personnel in order to
allow him time to clean the murder scene and alter the evidence of
her killing. 100 Although Williams is charged with child abuse
murder under the federal murder statute1° ' and apparently had no
specific intent to kill his daughter, the fact that his act was
committed as part of a long pattern of physical, psychological, and
emotional abuse against a vulnerable victim that directly resulted
in her death renders his crime especially morally reprehensible and
adequately aggravated to warrant capital punishment. Of course,
the capital defense bar could seize upon Justice Kennedy's
language to insist that the death penalty is disproportionate for
unintentional killings and that such offenses should now fall within
the categorical prohibition for offenses. One would imagine that
Enmund and Tison settled this-so long as a death actually occurs,
the death penalty remains available even if the killing was
unintentional (as all felony murders are, by definition). Then again,
one would imagine that Penry I settled the cluestion of the death
penalty's application to the mentally retarded7° 2 and that Stanford
v. Kentucky settled the question of the death penalty's application
to those who kill while under the age of eighteen. 1°3"No legislative
practice or legislative judgment about the gravity of a crime and
the just deserts of the criminal is safe in a world in which the
Court's independent judgment rules all.
Moreover, if we are still to take the Enmund-Tison rule
seriously and assume that the death penalty remains permissible
for a non-triggerman accomplice who commits an unintentional
100. United States v. Williams, 2007 WL 2916123, at *1-2 (D. Haw. Oct. 2,
2007).
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2006) (provisions making it a federal first-
degree murder when the murder is committed in the perpetration of child abuse
or as part "of a pattern or practice of assault or torture against a child").
102. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (upholding imposition of death
penalty for the mentally retarded), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002) (the execution of a mentally retarded criminal is prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment).
103. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding imposition of
death penalty for offenders who committed murder at ages 16 and 17,
respectively), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit imposition of the death penalty on
offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed).
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murder (where there is major participation in a felony and reckless
indifference to human life), then the Court must be forced to take
seriously the reality that some non-homicide crimes, such as the
rape of a child, may be committed with such brutality and may be
so highly aggravated that they arguably produce more individual
and social harm than an unintentional murder. As Justice Alito
observed, "is it really true that every person who is convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death is more morally depraved
than every child rapist?" 104 The Kennedy Court's answer is "yes"
because its standard of moral depravity is determined by the taking
of a life. But Justice Alito's question (which, it turns out, is
probably rhetorical) captures the difficulty with the majority's
absolutist comparative harm standard.
Finally, Kennedy's influence might be felt in a per se challenge
to prosecuting the mentally ill for a capital offense, seeking to
extend a categorical exemption to this class of offenders. In light of
Atkins and Roper, the American Bar Association has led a
movement to create legislative exemptions for the mentally ill.
10 5
The Court's decision in Panetti v. Quarterman 16-although not a
categorical exemption case, but rather a case involving a
straightforward claim of competence to be executed under Ford v.
Wainwright'0 7-helped shine greater light on the problem of
mental illness in the criminal justice system generally and in
capital cases specifically.' 0 8 It is likely that constitutional litigation
104. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2676 (Alito, J., dissenting). See also Berman &
Bibas, supra note 52, at 361-62 (presenting the argument for why some child
rapists may be more deserving of capital punishment than murderers).
105. See Paul M. Igasaki et al., Recommendation and Report on the Death
Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 668 (2006); Ronald J. Tabak, Mental Disability and Capital
Punishment: A More Rational Approach to a Disturbing Subject, 34 HuMAN
RIGHTS 5 (Spring 2007); Helen Shin, Note, Is the Death of the Death Penalty
Near? The Impact of Atkins and Roper on the Future of Capital Punishment for
Mentally Ill Defendants, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 465 (2007). But cf Eileen P.
Ryan & Sarah B. Berson, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 25 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REv. 351, 365-71, 381 (2006) (stating that, if a categorical exemption
for the mentally ill is to be established, it should apply only to those with "Axis I
disorders in which there is psychosis" and criticizing the ABA Task Force
recommendations).
106. Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
107. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
108. See Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death
Penalty, and Human Dignity, 5 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 257 (2007). In addition, Carol
Steiker's thoughtful analysis of Panetti suggests that after Panetti, "the grounds
for that [new substantive] standard will draw the Court (or lower courts in the first
instance) into the same kind of substantive Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
reflected in the Atkins and Simmons decisions." Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v.
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on this question will reach the Court. In that event, however, the
Court will not be comparing the harms caused by the mentally ill
offender's crime, as in Kennedy and Coker, but the offender's
moral culpability, as in Atkins and Roper. But the claim will
nonetheless force the Roberts Court to again grapple with the
scope of the existing categorical exemption framework, which
Kennedy reaffirms in its entirety.
IV. KENNEDY AND THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF FORMAL
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Kennedy comes at a time when some legal scholars and
commentators, particularly those who follow the Supreme Court
closely, have indicated that we have now moved beyond debates
about the proper role of the Court and about the wisdom of
particular exercises of judicial review. 10 9 No more of the debate
over judicial activism and judicial restraint; rather, they contend,
we have now reached the point in the evolution of
constitutionalism at which the real (and, in their view, appropriate)
debate is exclusively a substantive one. 110 As Cliff Sloan put it
recently in an online debate, "[1]et's retire the label of 'activist'
once and for all, and have at it on the issues.""' Andrew Siegel
amplifies this point, explaining that "the gap between the reality of
constitutional law (in which groups of judges committed to a broad
judicial role battle over the substance of the rights to be jealously
protected) and the rhetoric of constitutional politics (in which
Quarterman: Is There a "Rational Understanding" of the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 299 (2007).
109. See posting of Andrew Siegel (amsiegal) to PrawfsBlawg, http://www.
prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/week26/index.html (June 26, 2008,
14:28 EST); posting of Cliff Sloan to Slate.com, http://www.slate.com/id/
2193813/entry/2194352/ (June 26, 2008, 15:49 EST); posting of Howard
Wasserman to PrawfsBlawg, http://www.prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2008/week26/index.html (June 26, 2008, 15:16 EST).
110. See Siegel, supra note 109; Wasserman, supra note 109.
111. Sloan, supra note 109. Cf KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2006)
(rejecting the language of "judicial activism" and offering a new model for
resolving the tension between conservative views of constitutional interpretation
and those who defend the "living Constitution"); Caprice L. Roberts, In Search
of Judicial Activism: Dangers in Quantifying the Qualitative, 74 TENN. L. REV.
567 (2007) (exploring the difficult meaning of "judicial activism" and
cautioning against efforts to determine activism empirically).
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liberal 'activists' battle conservatives committed to 'judicial
restraint') has grown untenable."'' 12
Let me concur in part and dissent in part and explain why cases
like Kennedy require us to be more cautious about ratifying
absolute and aggressive judicial review, particularly in the death
penalty area. I agree that the labels "judicial activism" and
"judicial restraint" have become rather meaningless in our
constitutional dialogue and if we all saw fit to abandon them
altogether, there would be little reason to quarrel with that
decision. Political figures and commentators on politics from both
sides of the political aisle often use that terminology as a rhetorical
device, though with varying degrees of success (which perhaps
depends upon how many voters care much about, or pay much
attention to, questions about the proper role of judges, a critically
important question in our constitutional system but one wonders
whether it carries the same weight with most voters as questions
about jobs, taxes, and national security).' 13 I also take Professor
Seigel's point that the Supreme Court has firmly embraced its core
review function in constitutional cases and that the differences
among the justices have more to do with differing substantive
visions of constitutional law-as I have said elsewhere, the modem
Supreme Court's immodest understanding of its power has created
the impression that it does not like to cede ground to the political
branches or to other non-judicial decision-makers (or even to state
courts). 114
I would add a few caveats to Professor Seigel's otherwise
accurate comments about the current Court. For example, Justice
Thomas has expressed his understanding of the Court's limits in
war powers cases; 15 Justice Scalia has consistently urged that the
Court get out of the substantive due process business I 16 and has
exerted an effort to extend the political question doctrine to
112. Siegel, supra note 109.
113. See Alan Dershowitz, Reactionary Activism, HUFFINGTON POST, July 23,
2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-dershowitz/reactionary-activism-b57
453.html; Klaus Marre, McCain Lambastes Judicial Activism, THE HILL, May 6,
2008, http://thehill.com/campaign-2008/mccain-lambastes-judicial-activism-2008-
05-06.html.
114. See J. Richard Broughton, Judicializing Federative Power, 11 TEX.
REv. L. & POL. 283, 309-10 (2007); Broughton, supra note 6, at 658.
115. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 678-81 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting), superseded by statute as stated in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229, 2234 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 582-83 (2004) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
116. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1002
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Cruzan v. Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300-01 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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political gerrymandering cases;"17 the Chief Justice has asserted the
need for greater deference in federal habeas cases involving state
prisoners; T 8 and the Court has (though rarely) employed language
of deference such as the language that characterized Gonzales v.
Raich's recognition of broad federal criminal law powers under the
Commerce Clause." l9 So it is hardly true that all of the Justices
have wholly abandoned structural limits on judicial review. On the
whole, though, it is true that the Court's majorities have not lately
taken seriously the notion that the Court's powers are meaningfully
constrained by structural limits. And that failure is particularly
apparent in the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence and its
approach to claims of categorical exemption from the death
penalty, a subject area that often is conspicuously omitted from the
debates about judicial activism, in favor of issues related to
substantive due process, religion, and equal protection.
120
If the idea expressed in this recent commentary, however, is to
abandon from constitutional discourse all structural concerns about
the role of courts and the consequences of judicial action for both
the vertical and horizontal separation of governmental power and
to exclusively favor arguments about the substantive reach of
constitutional provisions, then a dissent is in order. Whether we
use the unhelpful label of "judicial activism" or some other
nomenclature is beside the point: structural concerns about
institutions and the effects of judicial power are not mutually
exclusive of substantive concerns about the merits of constitutional
issues. And the "broad" conception of the judicial role that justifies
the "jealous" protection of individual rights does not tell us much
about how aggressive the Court should be when interpreting the
117. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 267-69 (2004) (plurality opinion
of Scalia, J.).
118. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1683-84 (2007)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing the state courts were entitled to greater
deference from federal courts under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 560-61 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court owed deference to lower court factual
findings and asserting a narrow view of the role of federal habeas courts in
allowing state prisoners to raise procedurally defaulted constitutional claims).
119. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (employing deferential
review by finding that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that failure
to regulate intrastate manufacture of marijuana would leave a gap in the federal
Controlled Substances Act).
120. Of course, there are scholars who argue that despite the Court's exertion
of judicial review in the capital sentencing area, that review has not proven
useful. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment
Regulation of the Capital-Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 796-97
(1998); Liebman, supra note 77, at 122-30.
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structural provisions of the original text of the Constitution when a
case does not directly implicate the Constitution's individual rights
provisions. And even when individual rights are at stake, the scope
of judicial review of political action remains worthy of attention,
especially when the power is exercised to undermine the political
community's reasoned efforts to control the people by responding
to the problems of violent crime.
I have emphasized the critical role of institutional arrangements
in ordering and administering the criminal justice system, as those
arrangements enable the government to control the governed and
ultimately itself. 121 Courts have a special but carefully and
purposely limited role in those arrangements. Constitutional
controls and limits are not just for political actors; they exist for
judges, too, no matter how omnipotent the modem Supreme Court
fancies itself. 122 As Rick Garnett has thoughtfully explained, there
is much virtue in judicial humility. 123 Granting courts a blank
check to simply "have at it" on the merits of constitutional issues
may ultimately result in ignoring important checks on their
institutional power and greater likelihood that they will abandon
any meaningful sense of humility. Moreover, as I have previously
argued, courts compromise the Constitution's framework and
vision for responsible citizenship and self-government when they
narrow the distance between themselves and the political
institutions that filter out and moderate popular passions and
prejudices. 124 This design becomes critical when we consider how
best to define and punish violent crime. 125 Of course, courts play a
vital role in constraining political forces, and the Eighth
Amendment plainly imposes a judicially enforceable outer limit on
criminal punishment. But when the exercise of the judiciary's
power simply mimics the kind of action that we should desire and
expect of political actors, courts undermine their own credibility as
responsible agents of limited government and constitutional
constraint and simultaneously compromise the constitutional value
of allowing the political branches of government to do their work
121. See Broughton, supra note 6, at 662.
122. See id. at 662-63.
123. Kermit Roosevelt III & Richard W. Gamett, Debate, Judicial Activism
and its Critics, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 112, 119 (2006) (referencing a
lecture by Walter F. Murphy on "Constitutional Virtues"). See also Posner,
supra note 80, at 56 (stating that "U]udicial modesty is not the order of the day
in the Supreme Court").
124. See ROGER M. BARRUS ET AL., THE DECONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
AMERICA: THE FORGOTFEN FRAILTIES OF DEMOCRATIC RULE 121-22 (2004);
Broughton, supra note 6, at 659-60.
125. Broughton, supra note 6, at 660; Broughton, supra note 114, at 310.
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effectively.' 26 As Judge Richard Posner explained of the Roper
decision, "[the Court] was doing what a legislature asked to allow
the execution of seventeen-year-old murderers would be doing:
making a political judgment."'127 The same can be said of the
Court's work in Kennedy. Moreover, the Court knows how to
articulate Eighth Amendment deference to the penal judgments of
the community-its non-capital Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
has recognized and enforced limits on the Court's imposition of its
own value judgments in the realm of criminal punishment. 128 But
the Court has followed a divergent approach to capital and non-
capital proportionality review, an approach that has led to the
rather bizarre result of liberally permitting severe punishments for
non-violent crimes but aggressively scrutinizing and invalidating
severe punishments for violent crimes. It seems strange that the
community's moral and political judgment is entitled to less
weight and is subject to more exacting judicial intervention when it
is imposing harsh penal sanctions for the most brutal of crimes.
Indeed, other scholars, like Rachel Barkow, have noted the
untenable nature of the Court's dual-track approach to Eighth
Amendment proportionality review.129 This approach further leads
us to wonder whether, though the Court is capable of self-enforcing
institutional restraints in reviewing criminal punishments, the lure of
constitutionalizing the Justices' moral sensibilities has become too
appealing in death penalty cases.
Of course, the constitutional design requires more of political
actors and institutions, which, to competently and safely control
the people, must take seriously the social controls necessary and
appropriate for preventing and punishing violent crime. With
homicide rates rising in certain parts of the country, the spread of
gang violence (particularly to areas beyond major cities), and the
continuing threats to community safety posed by drug and firearms
trafficking (and the attendant connections between trafficking and
violent crime), it is especially important that political actors
126. See BARRUS, supra note 124, at 112 ("[T]he conviction that judicial
officials are also political actors can have undesirable effects on the behavior of
citizens.").
127. See Posner, supra note 80, at 47.
128. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003) (noting the
"longstanding" deference afforded to legislatures in crafting criminal
punishments).
129. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1267266 (follow "Download" hyperlink, and then choose a location from
which to download).
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exercise their responsibility to soberly and intelligently identify the
best uses of the criminal law and criminal punishment.
130
Sometimes justice requires that political actors adopt robust penal
sanctions in response to these conditions of violent crime; at other
times, political actors must become more sensitive to the societal
consequences of unnecessarily harsh punishments where offenders
are not demonstrably dangerous to the community or whose crimes
lack sufficient gravity to justify the kind of moral desert
appropriate for serious acts of violence. Yet, notwithstanding the
legislative trends toward more severe punishments for violence
against children, our national political dialogue--consider, in
particular, the 2008 presidential campaign-shows little more than
cursory attention to the problem of violent domestic crime.131
Congress retains ample, though properly circumscribed, powers to
enact important federal criminal law reforms, and the President's
law enforcement and criminal justice powers are perhaps the most
robust of those in the arena of domestic policy.' 32 This institutional
130. See FED. BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES:
PRELIMINARY SEMIANNUAL UNIFORM CRIME REPORT (2008), http://www.fbi.gov/
ucr/2008prelim/table l.html (showing increases in murder in nonmetropolitan
counties and in cities of 50,000 to 99,999 and a sharp increase in murder in cities
of under 10,000). Of course, the news on crime rates is not all discouraging: as the
most recent FBI data show, some of the rises are slow, and over a longer period
the violent crime rate nationally has actually decreased. See id. at tbl. 3.
131. See Radley Balko, Criminal Justice Unfairly Ignored on Trail,
POLITICO, July 17, 2008, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0708/11804.
html; Posting of Douglas A. Berman to Sentencing Law & Policy (May 5, 2008,
10:16 EST), http://www.sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw andjpolicy/
2008/05/will-the-2008-p.html. But see Senator John McCain, Remarks at
National Sheriffs' Association in Indianapolis, Ind. (July 1, 2008), http://www.
JohnMcCain.com/informing/news/speeches (follow "07.01.08" hyperlink)
(discussing various criminal justice policies). Incidentally, both Senator McCain
and Senator Barack Obama responded to the Supreme Court's decision in
Kennedy, and both condemned the ruling. See Joan Biskupic, McCain, Obama
Both Slam Court Decision, USATODAY, June 26, 2008, http://www.usatoday.
com/news/washington/2008-06-25-scotus-child-rapeN.htm. Senator Obama's
position was perhaps more surprising, though during the campaign he said so
very little about his views on major issues of criminal justice that it would be
difficult to discern whether his view of the Court's work in Kennedy was
markedly different from his views on capital punishment issues more generally.
Perhaps, then, the most surprising aspect of Senator Obama's position on
Kennedy is that he even stated it in the first place.
132. The Rehnquist Court's judicial enforcement of federalism norms placed
significant limits on Congress's criminal law-making authority pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Lopez
v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). But the Court's decision in Gonzales v.
Raich makes clear that Congress's powers in the field of criminal justice remain
substantial, as a consequence of both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause. 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). See also Perez v. United States, 402
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scheme enables political forces to engage in sober reflection and
intelligent action to address criminal violence. But they will be
much less likely to do so if they know, on the one hand, that
reviewing judges will do their jobs for them, or on the other hand
that judges will simply ignore the reasoned political will of the
community (refined by political institutions) and enforce their own
will in its stead.
133
In the final analysis, Kennedy reminds us to ask a question that
the Court has not asked itself in its categorical exemption
jurisprudence (or elsewhere, really): if courts are protecting us
from the political branches and political majorities, who is
protecting us from the courts?
That question is neither unreasonable nor anachronistic.
V. CONCLUSION
The punishment of violent crime is among the most solemn of
social and political responsibilities. But in modem political life,
reviewing courts and the Supreme Court in particular too often
supplant political institutions as the forum for debating the
desirability of capital punishment and certain limits on its
infliction. r34 There are compelling policy arguments-for example,
that the aggravated rape of a child should not be punished by death
and that lawmakers should not enact legislation permitting such a
U.S. 146, 151-52 (1971) (reasoning that the Commerce Clause embraces purely
local activities that are part of a larger class of economic activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce). The Spending Clause also remains a
meaningful source of congressional power to effect criminal justice policy. See,
e.g., United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 949 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding
portion of federal bribery statute as necessary and proper to carrying into
execution the spending power).
As for the President, he can recommend legislation to Congress, give it
information on the state of the Union relative to criminal justice, and veto
criminal justice legislation that is unwise or unconstitutional. See U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3 & art. I, § 7. He can also appoint judges who will render decisions in
criminal cases and who, in his view, may reach decisions on criminal justice
issues that would be consistent with his vision of criminal law and procedure.
The Criminal Justice Presidency, as I refer to it, is the subject of a separate
scholarly project.
133. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[I]f [the courts] should be disposed to exercise WILL
instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of
their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if it proved
anything, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from that
body.").
134. See Broughton, supra note 6, at 658-59.
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punishment. Indeed, the Kennedy majority makes many of those
arguments. My point, though, is that those arguments-however
compelling-have virtually nothing to do with the meaning and
scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, as Justice
Alito correctly explains in his Kennedy dissent. And their inclusion
in an opinion that attempts to interpret that Clause only serves to
undermine both the Court's legitimacy and the functioning of the
political processes in a constitutional democracy. Thus, I continue
to urge, as I have in this Article, greater attention to structural and
institutional concerns when evaluating capital punishment
jurisprudence.
This is not to say that appellate courts should get out of the
business of reviewing criminal punishments. But the question is
not whether the Court can enforce constitutional limits on
punishment; rather, the question is about the level of
aggressiveness or deference that the Court will apply to the
considered moral judgments and lived experiences of political
communities. Indeed, there is a compelling argument to be made
that where the crimes involved are non-violent and result in
minimal harm, courts ought to be more robust in reviewing facially
harsh sentences and in enforcing limits on political actors.
Conversely, where the crime is violent, the defendant's moral
culpability is adequately established, and the harms-both
individual and social-are undeniably substantial, reviewing courts
should be more reluctant to interfere with the political
community's considered moral judgment and lived experiences, as
refined through the processes of making law.
Precisely because we care about the formal institutional
arrangements for controlling the people, we should be troubled by
the Death Penalty Code that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
devised over the course of thirty years. 3 Through that Code the
Court now mandates extensive regulatory procedures for the
capital sentencing proceeding to ensure the narrowing of death-
eligibility and yet simultaneously distrusts the effectiveness of
those procedural requirements so much that the Court dictates-
through its own assessments of culpability and harm and with no
deference to the judgments and sensibilities of political
communities-the categories of crimes and offenders that can be
subject to capital punishment in the first instance. Perhaps the
Roberts Court will eventually find a way to reject and dismantle
that Code. But if Kennedy is any indication (and, as I have
explained here, I think it is), let us not hold our collective breath.
135. See J. Richard Broughton, The Roberts Court and the Death Penalty
Code, 12 JoNEs L. REv. 145, 149-50 (2008).
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Rather, in the death penalty arena at least, it is more likely that we
can expect the Court, like Minos in Dante's Hell, to continue
wrapping its tail around itself, employing its own judgment and
penal theory to dictate by itself-and for the Nation-the
seriousness of a crime, the appropriate state of public morality, and
the acceptability of capital punishment.
